As the United States now takes a more hostile stance towards NATO, what are the security implications for Asia?
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More than a month after Donald Trump’s second term as president, U.S. foreign policy has been subverted, especially in Europe.
The U.S. tariffs against neighbors, blasted traditional European allies, and Taking a pro-Russian stance against Ukraine In front of the previous government.
When asked if the transatlantic alliance between Europe and the United States had died, David Roche, a senior investor in quantum strategy strategist, made it clear: “Yes… it’s over.”
“Basically, the Trump administration is not interested in the league, it’s just a deal,” he said. “Trust has been broken. Without trust, you won’t be able to form an alliance.”
The question now is: What impact does this have on allies in the Asia-Pacific region, especially in the region?
“American-friendly Asian elites should not assume that U.S. assets will be reduced from the size of Europe to the size of Asia,” wrote Adam Garfinkle, a former distinguished interviewer at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore, in a February 24 comment.
Asian allies should believe that the reduction in the U.S. global military footprint could make U.S. security-assured logistics in Asia more difficult, more expensive, and less credible, Garfinkle wrote.
There is a Security treaties of six countries In the Asia-Pacific region, military bases are owned in the Philippines, South Korea and Japan. Although Singapore is not an ally of the US treaty, it has long-term defense relations with the US military.
They should assume that all assistance and capacity-building programs in our country will end.
Adam Garfinkle
Previous Distinguished Visiting Fellow at S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Garfinkle also said that Asian countries that host U.S. bases may not increase importance or respect but face greater demands for “offset payments”.
“They shouldn’t have provided continuity for regional forums like Quad and Aukus yet. They should assume that all the aid and capacity-building programs in our country will end – soon,” Garfinkle said.
Quadrilateral refers to diplomatic partnerships between Australia, India, Japan and the United States, while Aukus refers to trilateral security partnerships between Australia, Britain and the United States, which are not reciprocal treaties like NATO.
Roach said the Trump administration’s position was a “huge shift”.
He said: “Whether you are South Korea, Japan, or even Singapore, yes, you can’t expect the United States to defend you… All these states in Asia, which implicitly or explicitly count on the protection of the United States, cannot rely on this protection, nor on this protection.”
On February 12, US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth Said at Ukrainian Defense Contact Group Meeting This distinct strategic reality prevents the United States of America from focusing primarily on European security. ”
He added: “The United States faces a threat to its impact on our homeland. We must – we must – focus on the security of our own borders.”
Taiwan: Next flash point?
One area of interest is the cross-border relationship between Taiwan and China. Since 2016, China has stepped up its speech on the island, conducted several military exercises, and vowed to “reunite” with Taiwan.
China has never given up its claim to Taiwan – The Chinese Nationalist Party or Kuomintang has been in autonomy since defeating the Communist Party in 1949. Chinese President Xi Jinping Unify the mainland into “The necessity in history. ”
Roach said the Trump administration’s face-to-face face to face with Ukraine has greatly increased the risk of China’s military operations against Taiwan.
“Now it’s necessary to be convinced that if they blocked the energy tanker to Taiwan, the United States wouldn’t fight for it,” he said.
But, S. Bernard Loo, coordinator of the International Research Strategy Research Program at RajaratnamSchool, said Taiwan will rely on its so-called “silicon shield” to protect it.
This refers to Taiwan’s key position in the chip industry that will prevent China’s direct military action, as Taiwan is a company like this Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company and Foxconn – also known as She is a precision industryoo said.
He also pointed out that although China may have a stronger army, the Russian-Ukrainian war should teach China that “war is indeed difficult.” He cites factors such as terrain, difficulties in the power of amphibious landings, and unpredictable weather conditions in the Taiwan Strait, including possible typhoons.
“I think the last thing Xi Jinping wants is in the Taiwan War, just because that’s the case,” Lu said.
New security structure?
exist Analysis of works in November 2024 For the Asia Pacific Leadership Network, Frank O’Donnell, a senior research consultant for the network, said: “Trump’s historic focus on the American alliance and partnerships (rather than value) will constitute his new administration’s perspective on the region’s greater degree than before.”
He wrote that this view would spark a confrontation between the United States and its major Indo-Pacific partners, whether Trump believes they are paying enough “protective funds” for U.S. strategic cooperation and military deployment.
In his first semester, Trump said South Korea should pay more for US military presence There.
“This impulse and unpredictable ability of Trump may drive Indo-Pacific countries to take the necessary steps to improve American defense and political autonomy,” O’Donnell wrote.
Roche said that like the Asian Nato can be achieved, centered on Japan, South Korea and Singapore, and Taiwan. Other countries in Asia may also line up after the entity, he said.
But the core of the problem is “decreasing the credibility of American power globally.”
“Whether you are South Africa, Zimbabwe, Mexican minerals, or Singapore, the biggest effect is the huge depreciation of US credibility as a currency,” Roche said.
